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Abstract. This paper analyzes the market entry of Red Parcel Post, a new player in the German
Business-to-Business (B2B) parcel market. Currently there are four large service providers in the
German B2B parcel market. Each of these incumbent providers operates - albeit with varying
degrees of automation - with a classical multi-hub-and-spoke network. Red Parcel Post plans to
enter the B2B parcel market with a completely new parcel delivery system for the delivery of B2B
parcels throughout Germany based on a new transport network design, and RFID- and GPS-based
operations. Such operations shall enable the entrant to offer new services to potential customers and
realize lower costs and prices than the established firms. We describe the market and contrast the
incumbents' and the entrant's business strategies. Moreover, we develop a model to analyze the
effect of the entrant's market entry on competitive strategies, market shares, prices, costs and profits.
First, we solve the game-theoretic model analytically to derive qualitative results. In a second step,
we simulate market entry and competition by calibrating the model with data from the German B2B
market illustrating the impact of market entry in various scenarios.
Keywords: market entry, incumbent, competitive strategies, market shares, B2B parcel market, 
Cournot model, calibration.
1.   Executive Summary – Synopsis
This paper analyzes the market entry of Red Parcel Post, a new player in the
German Business-to-Business (B2B) parcel market. Currently there are four large
1. A previous, shorter version of this article entitled "Market Entry and Competitive Strategies in
the German B2B Parcel Market" was presented in May 2008 at the "16th Conference on Postal
and Delivery Economics" organized by the Center for Research in Regulated Industries
(CRRI). We would like to thank conference participants and especially Michael A. Crew and
Paul R. Kleindorfer for helpful comments and suggestions. The conference version was
subsequently published in the conference proceedings entitled "Progress in the Competitive
Agenda in the Postal and Delivery Sector", edited by M. A. Crew and P. R. Kleindorfer.
Publisher: Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
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service providers in the German B2B parcel market. In our analysis, we describe
the market and contrast the incumbents' and the entrant's business strategies.
Moreover, we develop a game-theoretic model to analyze the effect of Red
Parcel's market entry on competitive strategies, market shares, prices, costs and
profits. First, we solve the game-theoretic model analytically to derive qualitative
results. In a second step, we simulate market entry and competition by calibrating
the model with data from the German B2B market illustrating the impact of
market entry in various scenarios.
We show that entry with a new delivery system that leads to lower fixed costs,
but possibly higher variable cost is highly attractive for Red Parcel Post. As long
all incumbent operators are still active in the market after the entry of Red Parcel
Post, prices will decrease and the incumbent operators will lose total contribution
margin (TCM). In contrast, if Red Parcel Post drives out one competitor, the
remaining competitors will benefit from Red Parcel Post’s entry through higher
prices, larger market shares and higher TCM.
It is not clear, however, if and when we will see these developments in the
market. The long run effects on prices and TCM depend on the evolution of the
RFID technology, in particular the development of the unit tagging costs and the
costs for RFID writing and reading devices which determine Red Parcel Post's
variable costs. Given that costs for the application of RFID on a unit level (i.e.,
parcel tagging) are expected to decrease over time, there is a high likelihood that
market entry of Red Parcel Post becomes feasible and that the developments
outlined in this paper materialize. However, in addition to the technical progress
in the RFID technology, learning curve/experience effects will also work in
favour of Red Parcel Post. If the decrease in variable cost of Red Parcel Post is
high enough, we will observe lower prices and a decrease in TCM of the
incumbent operators, even if Red Parcel Post drives out one competitor.
Logistics service providers have frequently been considered to be on a
comparatively low level with respect to their innovation activities compared to
firms in other industries. One broader conclusion that can be made from our paper
is that innovation can change the structure and competitive forces in markets for
logistics services. With a new market approach and a new, technology-driven
parcel delivery system, Red Parcel Post's attempt includes both, product/service
and process innovations.
The paper is of interest to service providers in the parcel market in general and
the B2B market in particular. Recommendations can be derived for incumbent
providers with respect to competitive changes they might encounter and for
entrants with respect to the prerequisites for a successful market entry.
Furthermore, the analysis of the products, market segments, customer
requirements, and competitive situation as well as the parcel delivery systems of
the established firms and the incumbent provider helps parcel customers to better
understand the current development and potentially future evolution of the B2B
parcel market. Moreover, the results derived from the model can support B2B
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parcel customers in their service provider switching decision. Finally, the paper
is of interest to consultants and industry observers because it analyzes new
strategies and developments in strategies and delivery systems of B2B parcel
providers.
2.   Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the market entry of Red Parcel Post, a new player in the
German Business-to-Business (B2B) parcel market. Currently there are four large
service providers in the German B2B parcel market. Each of these incumbent
providers operates - albeit with varying degrees of automation - with a classical
multi-hub-and-spoke network. Red Parcel Post plans to enter the B2B parcel
market with a completely new parcel delivery system for the delivery of B2B
parcels throughout Germany based on a new transport network design, and RFID-
and GPS-based operations. Instead of the classical multi-hub-and-spoke network,
the network of Red Parcel will consist of only 4 hubs with no extra collection or
delivery depots in the regions and instead of depots, 60 regional changeover
stations are planned without warehouse or sorting devices. All parcels will be
tagged with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and powerful transport
optimization software (potentially GPS-based) will be used to optimize
transportation and delivery of parcels to the consignees. Such operations shall
enable the entrant to offer new services to potential customers and realize lower
costs and prices than the established firms. Red Parcel Post intends to guarantee
next day delivery (frequently a feature of express products only) and the shipment
of a wide range of units (from 200 grams to more than the frequent weight limit
of 31.5 kilograms). The expected price per shipment shall be approximately 10-
20% less than what the incumbents can offer today. Within 4 to 5 years after
market entry, Red Parcel Post expects to reach an annual sales volume of 850
million Euros, approximately 25% of DHL's current revenue in the German B2B
parcel market.
In our analysis, we describe the market and contrast the incumbents' and the
entrant's business strategies. Moreover, we develop a model to analyze the effect
of Red Parcel's market entry on competitive strategies, market shares, prices,
costs and profits. First, we solve the game-theoretic model analytically to derive
qualitative results. In a second step, we simulate market entry and competition by
calibrating the model with data from the German B2B market illustrating the
impact of market entry in various scenarios.
Our paper differs from previous works because it takes into account a new
parcel delivery system and distribution network - with inherent different cost
structures than the established multi-hub-and-spoke networks. In particular, our
paper differs from De Donder et al. (2002) who model the letter and Business-to-
Consumer (C2C) parcel market using a Bertrand model with constant marginal
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costs. Their main objective is to identify optimal access charges to parcel
operators who access the letter mail network in rural areas. This paper also differs
from Crew and Kleindorfer (2005) who analyze access policies and Ramsey-
optimal access prices to the Postal Operator's (PO's) network. In their model, the
PO has a universal service obligation in letters and parcels and enjoys a reserved
area in single-piece mail only. Entrants are modelled as a competitive fringe.
Contrary to both models, our focus is not on welfare, but on business issues.
In our model, the B2B market is not subject to universal service obligation (USO)
or access regulations. Moreover, we explicitly model different business strategies
and try to highlight the effects of entry and competition on economies of scale,
prices, profits and market shares. Our model is based on the German case.
Nevertheless, most results can be generalized to other markets and even other
industries with similar demand and cost structures. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first paper to analyze market entry and competitive strategies in the B2B
parcel market.
The paper is of interest to service providers in the parcel market in general and
the B2B market in particular. Recommendations can be derived for incumbent
providers with respect to competitive changes they might encounter and for
entrants with respect to the prerequisites for a successful market entry.
Furthermore, the analysis of the products, market segments, customer
requirements, and competitive situation as well as the parcel delivery systems of
the established firms and the incumbent provider helps parcel customers to better
understand the current development and potentially future evolution of the B2B
parcel market. Moreover, the results derived from the model can support B2B
parcel customers in their service provider switching decision. Finally, the paper
is of interest to consultants and industry observers because it analyzes new
strategies and developments in strategies and delivery systems of B2B parcel
providers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the German B2B parcel market. Section 3 presents the parcel delivery system of
the incumbent operators and Red Parcel Post. In Section 4, we present our game-
theoretic model and analyze the effect of the entrant's market entry on
competition, prices and profits. To shed light on the effect of market entry on
market shares and prospects of the incumbent operators, we present in Section 5
numerical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes our article.
3.   The German B2B parcel market
To analyze the particularities of the German B2B parcel market, it is warranted to
discuss developments on the parcel market and delineate the B2B market from
other market segments. This will help us to better understand the market segment
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we try to capture in our model and make realistic assumptions for the model if
needed.
3.1.  Products, Market Segments, and Customer Requirements
Without exception, all studies investigating the German market for parcels
indicate that the market has continuously grown over the past years and will
continue to do so for the years to come (BIEK, 2007; ITA Logistics, 2005;
Triangle Management Services, 2006). For example, from 2005 to 2006 the
number of shipments grew from 1,952 billion to 2,043 billion accounting for an
average growth rate of 4.7%, compared to an average of 3.8% between 1995 and
2006 (BIEK, 2007). Such high growth rates are at least double that of other
German industrial sectors (BIEK, 2007). However, despite the difficulties to
clear-cut market segments, the overall growth in the parcel market is not evenly
distributed across all segments. In the next three subsections, we differentiate
three important segments and examine each of them briefly.
3.1.1 Shipments from German Shippers to "National" vs. "International"
Consignees
International and premium shipments mainly account for the high growth
(Triangle Management Services, 2006). One well-known reason is the increased
globalization of economic activities which result in a higher demand for
international shipments. A second reason is that parcel companies which
traditionally focused on the domestic market have begun to offer international
products and to establish international networks. With parcel companies offering
a broadened product/service portfolio and the ability to deliver parcels through
high performance networks on a global scale, customers are more willing to ship
international parcels. The parcel company GLS provides an example for this
growth in international and express products. The company indicated that the
number of national shipments in Germany has shown growth at around 2 to 3%
per year, while international shipments grew at double digit rates (Triangle
Management Services, 2006).
3.1.2 Standard vs. Express Shipments
Figure 1 shows that several parcel companies offer both, standard (deferred) and
express (premium) products (ITA Logistics, 2005). In case of standard parcels,
the transit time is regularly slower and not specified or scheduled. Standard
products come along with a limited number of value-added services. In contrast,
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express products are delivered day and sometimes time-specific. Day and time
specific delivery is normally guaranteed and customers may choose money-back-
guarantees if service promises are not fulfilled. Value-added services include
tracing-and-tracking, information or proactive feedback.
While standard parcel products account by far for the majority of shipments,
profit margins are much lower than for express products. Similarly to the
international segment, express shipments also grow at above average rates. On the
downside for established companies, the level of competition in the express
segment has increased with the entry of DPD and GLS now offering road-based
express services. DPD and GLS are now aggressively seeking growth in this
segment (Triangle Management Services, 2006).
Figure 1: Product Segmentation
Source: ITA Logistics (2005), own research
Service provider Standard Express
DHL Europack Express Paket, 9:00, 12:00
DPD Standard / Prepaid G24, E10, E12
UPS Standard Express Saver, Express Express Plus
GLS Standard Next day Express (12:00), T10, T9, T8
TNT Übernacht Express, 09:00, 10:00, 12:00 Express
GO! Overnight (12:00)
DHL Business Paket, Europack DOX & WPX & ECX, Startday, Midday
DPD Standard / Prepaid International Express
UPS Standard, Expedited Express Saver, Express Express Plus
GLS GlobalParcel, Standard Parcel Europa Global Express (Der Kurier)
TNT Economy Express Global Express, 9:00 Express, 12:00 Express
FedEx International Priority, International First
GO! International
Chronopost Chrono International
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3.1.3 "Business-to-Consumer" (B2C) vs. "Business-to-Business" (B2B)
The last distinction we can make is whether the consignees are business
organizations or individuals/households. The market segment for B2C parcels is
larger (2004: 812 million shipments) than the B2B segment (2004: 570 million
shipments). The well-known German general direct mail order firms such as
QUELLE or OTTO - over decades the main shippers of parcels in Germany with
an annual volume of around 400 million parcels (Klaus & Kille, 2006) - have
witnessed a decline in their business. This decline goes along with a stagnation of
B2C parcel shipments in Germany. As a consequence, profit margins for the
established parcel carriers are low. In contrary, B2B shipments (e.g., spare parts,
office supplies, restocking of retail outlets) are growing at around 4%. Here,
parcel companies can differentiate and extend their service offerings, for
example, offer pick-up services, delivery confirmation, or multi-parcel options.
In the following, we solely focus on the German national B2B market for
standard parcels. To capture the competitive situation we first introduce the main
incumbent parcel service providers (parcel operators) as well as the entrant
provider Red Parcel Post, their market shares, product features offered, and
business models. Subsequently, we describe the parcel delivery systems,
networks and operations of the incumbent providers and Red Parcel Post.
3.2.  Competitive Situation
Figures 1 and 2 indicate that there are currently four large service providers in the
German B2B parcel market (ITA Logistics, 2005; Klaus & Kille, 2006). The
DHL parcel business is part of Deutsche Post World Net, the former monopolist
for letter and parcel delivery in Germany.
The liberalization of the German B2B parcel market has resulted in a decline
in market share over the years. Today, DHL holds a market share of
approximately 27%. DPD is controlled by the French national postal firm Groupe
La Poste (through GeoPost, Paris, a 100% subsidiary). The firm holds a market
share on the B2B parcel market of about 27%. UPS is a globally active integrator
who also offers standard B2B parcel services in Germany, with a market share of
21%. The fourth largest player in the market is GLS, owned by the British national
postal firm Royal Mail Group (through General Logistics Systems, Amsterdam,
a 100% subsidiary). GLS holds about 14% of the German B2B parcel market.
Figure 1 summarizes the product features for standard shipments which are
offered by the four major parcel service providers in the B2B segment. Some
services are regular features and included in the regular parcel price, while for
others customers have to pay a surcharge (ITA Logistics, 2005). A closer
examination of the product features shows that the pick-up of parcels is a regular
service offered. Due to DHL's strong presence in the B2C market (where parcels
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are also delivered on Saturday), DHL is the only competitor offering Saturday
delivery to business consignees. UPS' strong express network and IT-system
enables the firm to offer a number of value added services as a regular service to
standard parcel customers at no extra charge (e.g., shipping software, multi-piece
option).
Figure 2: Product Features of Standard Shipments
Source: ITA Logistics (2005), own research
3.3.   The Entrant: Red Parcel Post
Beginning in 2005, there were indications that a new firm, named Red Parcel
Post, will be established to enter the German B2B parcel market. Given the
competitive situation in the B2B parcel market the entrance of a completely new
player seems quite ambiguous:
• An oligopoly with four established providers
•  All four established providers belong to larger logistics groups or
former national postal monopolists
•  Necessary high investments to set up a parcel delivery system on the
green field
However, the new company's entry announcement has been taken seriously
by the established players. The key person behind Red Parcel Post is an
Service provider
Product
Serving segments
Surcharge Surcharge Surcharge Surcharge Surcharge Surcharge
Pick up
Pick up request (Adhoc/regular) Yes (Both) No Yes (Both) No Yes (Both) No Yes (Both) No Yes (Both) Yes Yes (Both) No
Late pick up No No No No No No No No No No No No
Saturday pick up No No No No No No No No No No No No
Delivery options
Saturday delivery Yes No No No No No No No No No No No
Money back guarantee No No No No No No No No No No No No
Delivery tries 2 No 3 No 3 No 3 No 3 No 2 No
After services
Delivery confirmation No No No No No No No No No Yes No No
Proof of delivery (POD) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Proactive negative alert No No No No No No No No No No No No
Value added services & others
Track & trace Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Shipping software No No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Multipiece option Yes No No No No No No No Yes No No No
Volumetric weight Yes No No No No No No No Yes No No No
Personal delivery No No No No No No No No No No No No
Receiver pays Yes No No No No No No No Yes No No No
Cash on delivery (COD) No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Insurance incl. 500€ No incl. 520€ No incl. 520€ No incl. 520€ No incl. 510€ No incl. 750€ No
UPS
Standard
Adhoc & contractual
DPD
Standard
Only contractual
GLS
Standard
Only contractual
DPD
Standard prepaid
Adhoc & contractual
DPD
Standard
Only contractual
DHL
Europack
Only contractual
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experienced top-manager in this industry and was previously Managing Director
of DPD and the parcel business of Deutsche Post World Net/DHL.
Red Parcel Post's goal is to enter and penetrate the German market with new
product features and the offer of a very competitive price (Böhmer & Cremer,
2004; Brönner, 2006). Red Parcel Post intends to guarantee next day delivery
(frequently a feature of express products only) and the shipment of a wide range
of units (from 200 grams to more than the frequent weight limit of 31.5
kilograms). The expected price per shipment shall be around 2 Euros --
approximately 10-20% less than what the incumbents can offer today. Within 4
to 5 years after market entry, Red Parcel Post expects to reach an annual sales
volume of 850 million Euros, approximately 25% of DHL's current revenue in the
German B2B parcel market.
In order to be able to offer competitive product/service features and
competitive prices, Red Parcel Post plans to enter the B2B parcel market with a
completely new parcel delivery system for the delivery of B2B parcels
throughout Germany based on a new transport network design, and RFID- and
GPS-based operations. This new transport and delivery system will lead to lower
fixed costs, but possibly higher variable costs.
4.   The Parcel Delivery System: Incumbents vs. Red Parcel Post
Each of the four incumbent parcel service providers operates with a classical
multi-hub-and-spoke network with multiple sorting activities in parcel processing
centers and delivery hubs. A service provider has to sort parcels in the parcel
processing center where parcels collected in the source region arrive. Sorting is
done according to the parcels' destination. After the line-haul between the sorting
centers (or hubs), parcels are sorted again according to the delivery sequence
before the delivery tours start (Rahn, 2004; Werners, Thorn, & Freiwald, 2001).
The delivery to the consignees accounts for the majority of total costs of
operations, similar to mail delivery networks (Dietl, Trinkner, & Bleisch, 2005).
Due to the pick-up service offered in the B2B parcel markets, collection of parcels
at the shippers accounts for a larger percentage than in the mail delivery network.
The handling costs at the parcel sorting centers and delivery hubs mainly consist
of the cost for sorting parcels.
DPD operates a European-wide network of depots and hubs (central transfer
points). A depot organizes the collection as well as the distribution of parcels
from/to the business customers. For shipments to nearby depots, line-hauls occur
between depots, for shipments to more distant depots, the parcels are shipped to
a hub and then further to the destination depot. The network in Germany consists
of 6 hubs and over 60 depots. An alternative capacity strategy, to handle peak
incoming volumes at a particular depot, is to reroute parcels to an adjacent depot.
Because the network has a large number of depots this strategy can be
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successfully deployed with minimum additional cost implication (Triangle
Management Services, 2006).Starting in 1990, DHL initiated a large transition
project and changed its parcel network from 140 sorting centers (with up to 9
handling steps) to a highly standardized parcel network of 33 standardized parcel
sorting centers throughout Germany (with a maximum of 3 handling steps) and
several hundred delivery bases. This project was finalized in mid 1995. It is
possible that DHL has the least capacity problems as their 33 parcel sorting
centers, especially in Eastern Germany, were built in anticipation of a higher than
realized future growth. While the parcels could principally be transported
between the sorting centers (or hubs) by ground service and/or using air service,
truck line hauls are the norm. Since Deutsche Post World Net/DHL is the major
national Postal operator, DHL can realize advantages in the delivery of parcels
through approx. 30,000 joint delivery routes (letters and parcels).
In Germany, the UPS parcel network consists of 5 central hubs and around 70
branches. B2B shipments account for around 80% of the business. Similar to DPD
parcels are transported to adjacent branches or for shipments to more distant
consignees via the hubs.
GLS operates in a similar manner as DPD, however, given the parcel volume,
on a lower scale. GLS' German parcel network consists of 2 main hubs and around
90 depots.
The potential entrant, Red Parcel Post, announced that it would set up and
operate the collection, sorting, transportation and distribution of parcels in a new
way compared to the established parcel service providers. After an order has been
received, the parcel is picked up and an RFID tag is placed on the parcel. During
the transportation to the hub, the delivery tour is computed by the computer center
and the parcel is assigned to a changeover station. At the hub this information
regarding delivery tour and changeover station is transferred to the RFID tag.
According to this information the parcel is placed into one of several containers
which are loaded on a large line-haul truck and transported to the changeover
station. At the changeover station, the containers are reloaded from the line-haul
truck to smaller delivery vans (see Figure 3) and the delivery information is
transferred from the RFID tag onto the navigation system of the delivery van. 
This new delivery process is described by four important changes compared
to a classical multi-hub-and-spoke network. First, the entire network will consist
of only 4 hubs (probably close to Magdeburg, Hannover, Dortmund and
Würzburg, see Figure 4) with no extra collection or delivery depots in the regions.
Instead of depots, 60 regional changeover stations are planned (without
warehouse or sorting devices).
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Figure 3: Delivery Processes of Red Parcel Post
Source: Brönner (2006)
Second, the entire system is built on latest technology. All parcels will be
tagged with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags. This will enable Red
Parcel Post to sort parcels more easily. Furthermore, a seamless tracking-and-
tracing of the parcels will be possible. Third, together with the RFID technology,
new transport vehicles will be used. Trucks loaded with small standardized
containers will transport the pre-sorted parcels to the changeover stations where
the containers are loaded on special delivery vans. This system eliminates sorting
activities. Forth, powerful transport optimization software (potentially GPS-
based) will be used to optimize transportation and delivery of parcels to the
consignees, which will be accomplished by around 1,000 drivers. Figure 5
provides more technical details about the production process of Red Parcel Post.
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Target area
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Figure 4: Hubs of Red Parcel Post
Source: Brönner (2006)
Figure 5: Parcel Delivery System
Source: Brönner (2006), own research
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5.   A Game-Theoretic Model of the German B2B Parcel Market
In this section, we try to model the German B2B parcel market and the effect of
Red Parcel Post's market entry. First, we develop a Cournot model of the current
situation in the German B2B parcel market. Then we extend this model though
the entry of Red Parcel Post. We solve both versions of our model analytically
and numerically.
We believe that a Cournot model fits well to approximate the current
situation, mainly because of the network character of B2B services. Each operator
has to design a complex network of hubs, depots, routes, vans, software, etc. This
network design basically determines the number of parcels that have to run
through the network because such a complex collection, transportation and
delivery network is hardly scalable. As soon as more than the optimal number of
parcels has to be processed, service quality will decline rapidly. If demand
continues to increase above a certain threshold, the network may even collapse.
Too little demand, on the other hand, is economically disastrous because of the
large percentage of fixed costs. Usually, the network needs a pre-specified
volume of parcels to run economically. The cost structure of its network forces an
operator to adjust prices in order to realize the optimal demand quantity. If
demand is too small, the operator will reduce its price, if demand is too large, the
operator has to increase its price.
Although each operator tries to differentiate itself from its competitors
through add-on services, the B2B services of DHL, DPD, UPS and GLS are
highly homogenous since each operator usually matches the services offered by
its competitors. The homogeneous character of standard national B2B parcel
services in Germany is also reflected by the fact that prices do hardly differ across
the four largest operators.
We formalize the setup described above and present a Cournot model where
n operators compete in quantities to supply a homogeneous good. The demand for
the good is given by  where p is the price and  is the number of
parcels delivered by the whole industry,  being operator i's parcel proceeds. We
assume a standard linear demand function given by 
where a represents the market size and b is a parameter for the price sensitivity in
the market. Operator i produces according to the cost function  given by 
with fixed costs  and variable costs . Due to economics of scale operator
i's average costs
  decrease in quantity, i.e., 
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Operator i's profits are 
if it produces  and total industry output is Q. All operators chose their quantities
simultaneously and each operator maximizes its profit given the quantities chosen
by the other operators.
Operator i's reaction function is computed as
                   
                                                                                                                 (1)
where  denotes the quantities chosen by the other operators. From (1) we
derive that the good is a strategic substitute.
In Subsection 4.1, which serves us as the benchmark case, we consider the
German B2B parcel market before the market entry of Red Parcel Post. In
Subsection 4.2, we then analyze what will happen after the market entry of Red
Parcel Post.
5.1.   The B2B Market Before the Entry of Red Parcel Post
In this subsection, we set  in order to represent the German B2B parcel
market before the market entry of Red Parcel Post. As mentioned in Section 2, the
post-entry market is composed out of the four large service providers DHL, DPD,
UPS and GLS. We assume that these four incumbent parcel service providers
have identical fixed costs since they operate with the same classical multi-hub-
and-spoke network. However, variable costs are assumed to differ among the four
large service providers such that the cost functions of operator  is given
by
Without loss of generality, we assume the following ordering of variable
costs: .
By solving the system of reaction functions (1) with , we derive the
equilibrium number of parcel proceeds by the four large service providers in the
pre-entry scenario as 
                
                                                                                                                                  (2)
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Comparative static yields that operator i's equilibrium number of parcel
proceeds decreases in its own variable costs and increases in variable costs of the
other operators.
As a direct consequence, we derive that the operator with the lowest variable
costs offers the highest number of parcel proceeds in equilibrium yielding the
following ordering of parcel proceeds:
                         
                                                                                                          (3)
From (2) we deduce the equilibrium price as
                           
                                                                                                         (4)
and compute the equilibrium profits of the incumbent operator  as 
Higher variable costs will decrease the equilibrium quantity chosen by
operator  and therefore increase the equilibrium price but decrease
equilibrium profits. The following condition guarantees that each of the four large
service providers makes non-negative equilibrium profits and therefore is active
in the pre-entry market:
                                                                                                           (5)
If  then in equilibrium the incumbent operator 4 will break-even
and the other incumbents will make positive profits.2 An increase in fixed costs
F or a decrease in the number of parcel proceeds  would force operator 4 to
exit the market.
2. Recall the ordering (3) of equilibrium profits.
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5.2.   The B2B Market After the Entry of Red Parcel Post
In this subsection, we analyze the German B2B market after the entry of Red
Parcel Post and therefore set . In the post-entry market the parameters
 denote the quantities chosen by the four large service providers
whereas denotes the respective quantity chosen by Red Parcel Post.3 As
mentioned above Red Parcel Post plans to enter the market with a completely new
parcel delivery system based on a new transport network design and RFID- and
GPS-based operations. We account for this new technology by modelling Red
Parcel Post with lower fixed costs and higher variable costs compared with the
four incumbent service providers. The cost functions of operator  is
therefore given by
with  and  .
By solving the system of reaction functions (1) with , the equilibrium
number of parcel proceeds by the incumbent operators denoted 
and  by Red Parcel Post, respectively, are given by
Since Red Parcel Post is assumed to have higher variable costs than the four
incumbents, i.e.,  , we derive that Red Parcel Post will chose
the lowest number of parcel proceeds in equilibrium.
The equilibrium price is then computed as
Comparison of the post-entry scenario with the pre-entry scenario leads to the
following conclusion: both the equilibrium number of parcel proceeds of the
incumbents  and the equilibrium price  will decrease after the
market entry of Red Parcel Post because Red Parcel Post will only enter the
market when its variable costs are lower than the equilibrium price, i.e. .
This result shows that the aggregate decrease in the incumbents' number of parcel
proceeds is higher than the quantity chosen by Red Parcel Post which yields a net
decrease in the equilibrium price in the post-entry scenario.
We now compute the equilibrium profits of operator  as
3. Note that the subscript i=5 is exclusively used for Red Parcel Post whereas the subscripts
i=1,…,4 still characterize the four established service providers (DHL, DPD, UPS and GLS).
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with  .
Due to condition (5) in Section 4.1, all four incumbents were active in the pre-
entry scenario. This may change, however, in the post-entry scenario: Depending
on the incumbents' fixed costs it is possible that after Red Parcel Post's market
entry not all incumbents will make positive equilibrium profits anymore and
therefore have to exit the market. This also holds true if we assumed that the
incumbents don't have equal fixed costs. However, by assuming equal fixed costs
for the incumbents we predict that the incumbents with the highest variable costs
will exit the market first.
By normalizing the fixed costs F such that the incumbent with the highest
variable costs (in our model incumbent 4) breaks even in the pre-entry scenario,
i.e., , we derive that the incumbent operator 4 has to exit the market
first. In this case, the number of parcel proceeds and price in equilibrium are given
similar to (2) and (4) in the pre-entry scenario with  instead of : 
Since the variable costs of Red Parcel Post are assumed to be higher than the
variable costs of the incumbent operator 4, i.e.,  , the equilibrium price
 will be higher compared to the corresponding price in the pre-entry
scenario.
6.   Numerical Results
The theoretical analysis performed above provides equilibrium prices and
equilibrium supply formulas for the pre-entry scenario as well as for the situation
after Red Parcel Post's market entry. Unfortunately, the theoretical results do not
shed light on the effect of market entry on market shares, profits etc. To obtain
some insight into these dimensions, we now resort to numerical simulation.
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6.1.   Calibration Assumption and Reference Case
In our model, we ignore more or less smaller competitors who target niche
markets. We focus on the four large incumbent operators DHL, DPD, UPS, and
GLS who provide basically identical services in the German B2B market. 
We start by calibrating the parameters related to the reference case before Red
Parcel Post's market entry. We try to calibrate the model in a way that we observe
the outcome in the German B2B parcel market in 2008. This outcome is
characterized by the data presented in Section 2.1: Given 570 million shipments
in 2004 and an annual growth rate of 4%, we calculate 650 million shipments as
actual demand. Furthermore we know the market shares of the incumbent
operators and the parcel price of 2.20 euro. 
What is unknown is the price elasticity of demand. However, as mentioned
by Triangle Management Services (2006) the B2B segment seems to be less price
sensitive than the B2C segment. Therefore, we assume a price elasticity of 0.5.
If we insert the data of the German B2B parcel market and the assumed price
elasticity to equations (1)-(3) in Section 4 we observe the cost structure presented
in Table 1. Even if the absolute values of variable cost depend on the assumed
price elasticity, the ordering of the variable cost is justifiable. DHL and DPD
operate the largest networks. Accordingly, they have higher fixed and lower
variable costs than their competitors. In addition, DHL's network is somewhat
better scalable because DHL can realize economies of scope between Deutsche
Post World Net’s letter and parcel businesses (e.g. through common delivery
routes). We model this advantage by assuming that DHL will remain in the
market even if it cannot cover its fixed costs through its parcel volume. UPS
operates a slightly smaller network than DHL and DPD resulting in lower fixed
and slightly higher variable costs. GLS operates the smallest network of the four
large competitors. We account for GLS' network size by assuming that GLS
realizes the smallest fixed and highest variable costs of all four competitors.
Table 1: Reference case
Table 1 shows variable costs, quantities and market shares for each of the
incumbent operators. From these we calculate the total contribution margin
(TCM) at market equilibrium in the reference case. TCM is the fraction of
revenues that contributes to offsetting fixed costs. In fact, the dimension of the
DHL DPD UPS GLS
c 1.00 1.00 1.27 1.58
q 175,500,000 175,500,000 136,500,000 91,000,000
p 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20
Market share 27.00% 27.00% 21.00% 14.00%
TCM 210,600,000 210,600,000 127,400,000 56,622,222
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values is not quiet conclusive, as they depend directly on our assumption of
variable costs. However, we can use the percentage decrease in TCM after Red
Parcel Post's market entry to assess the prospects of the incumbent service
operators.
The situation after market entry of Red Parcel Post depends on two
assumptions. First on the level of variable costs of Red Parcel Post, which
determine the market shares of the operators. Second on the fixed costs of the
incumbent operators, which determine whether one or more of the incumbent
operators will exit the market. Therefore, we are going to discuss two different
scenarios. In the first scenario, the four incumbent service operators remain active
in the B2B market after Red Parcel Post's market entry. In the second scenario,
we assume that GLS will exit the market after Red Parcel Post's market entry, as
the new total contribution margin of GLS is too small to cover fixed costs. In both
scenarios we consider three cases to take the effect of Red Parcel Post's variable
costs on market outcome into account. In the first case, Red Parcel Post's variable
costs are twice as large as the variable costs of DHL ( ). In the
second case, we assume that Red Parcel Post's costs are slightly higher than the
variable costs of GLS ( ) and in the third case we assume that
Red Parcel Post's variable costs are between the variable costs of UPS and GLS
( ).
6.2.   Scenario 1
Table 2 reports quantities, related market shares, market volume, and the
equilibrium price after the entry of Red Parcel Post. Except for market volume,
each of these variables depends positively on the variable costs of Red Parcel
Post.
Table 2: Quantities, market shares and prices (Scenario 1)
2.00 1.60 1.50
DHL 171,321,429 162,964,286 160,875,000
26.19% 24.60% 24.21%
DPD 171,321,429 162,964'286 160'875'000
26.19% 24.60% 24.21%
UPS 132,321,429 123,964,286 121,875,000
20.23% 18.71% 18.34%
GLS 86,821,429 78,464,286 76,375,000
13.27% 11.84% 11.49%
Red Parcel Post 25,071,429 75,214,286 87,750,000
3.83% 11.35% 13.20%
Market volume 654,178,571 662,535,714 664,625,000
Price 2.17 2.11 2.10
€.c parcelred 002 =
€.c parcelred 601 =
€.c parcelred 501 =
 cred parcel
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For each value of Red Parcel Post's variable costs, we observe decreasing
market shares for the incumbent operators and a decrease in the equilibrium price,
which results in a small increase in market volume. Due to the assumption of
homogenous products, the absolute decrease in number of parcels delivered by
the incumbent operators is the same for each operator. Consequently the
percentage decrease is larger for the smaller operators UPS and GLS. For
example, we observe in the second case ( ) a decrease of 7.14 %
for DHL and DPD whereas the decrease of UPS (9.18%) and GLS (13.78%) is
markedly larger. These results are in line with our theoretical findings in section
4. 
To assess the prospects for the incumbent service operators it is important to
look at the development of the TCM after the market entry of Red Parcel Post.
We summarize the change in TCM in Table 3 for each of the assumed values
of Red Parcel Post's variable costs. The two important findings are the following:
First, we observe larger decreases in TCM for lower values of Red Parcel Post's
variable costs. This is because lower variable costs of Red Parcel Post cause a
lower price and larger decreases in the number of parcels delivered by the
incumbent service operators. Second, even though the absolute decrease in TCM
is larger for the big incumbent operators, the largest percentage decrease is
observable for the smallest incumbent operator GLS. The reason for this result is
the higher percentage decrease in number of parcels delivered by GLS.
Table 3: Total Contribution Margin and percentage changes (Comparing pre-entry to Scenario 1
equilibrium outcomes)
This finding has an important implication. Even if we account for GLS'
network size by assuming that GLS realizes the smallest fixed costs, it seems to
be a reasonable assumption, that GLS is the first operator, which will exit the B2B
parcel market. The reason for the relative weakness of GLS compared to other
competitors is the necessity to realize economies of scale in the B2B parcel
market as long as operators organize a classical multi-hub-and spoke network.
2.00 1.60 1.50
DHL 200,690,816 181,588,775 176,127,518
-4.71% -13.78% -15.89%
DPD 200,690,816 181,588,775 176,127,518
-4.71% -13.78% -15.89%
UPS 119,719,387 105,074,489 101,116,612
-6.03% -17.52% -20.28%
GLS 51,541,609 42,096,712 39,884,722
-8.97% -25.65% -29.56%
Red Parcel Post 4,297,959 38,681,632 52,650,000
- - -
€.c parcelred 601 =
 cred parcel
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Because the incumbent competitors are able to realize higher economics of scale,
GLS has a competitive disadvantage. The importance to realize economics of
scale is lower if an operator uses a new parcel delivery system and network that
causes significantly lower fixed costs. This is one reason for the potential success
of Red Parcel Post's market entry. Even if variable costs are high, compared to the
incumbent operators, and therefore the realized market share is low, it is easier
for Red Parcel Post to cover its relative low fixed costs.
6.3.   Scenario 2
It is clear, that we can not predict market exit of any operator without knowing
more about the true cost structures. However, using the same cost structure and
demand as in the reference case, we are able to simulate the potential market
outcome after Red Parcel Post's entry and the exit of GLS.
We summarize the results of the second scenario in Table 4 and Table 5. The
price, number of parcels delivered by the incumbent operators, market shares of
the incumbent operators, and total contribution margin depend positively on the
variable costs of Red Parcel Post. It is obvious that the relations of these variables
with the variable costs of Red Parcel Post are not affected by the exit of GLS.
Therefore, the market volume is still negatively related to the variable costs of
Red Parcel Post.
Table 4: Quantities, market shares and prices (Scenario 2)
There are two important results in this scenario. First, in line with our
theoretical findings, the equilibrium price increases as long as the variable costs
of Red Parcel Post are higher than the variable costs of GLS. Therefore we
observe a slightly lower market volume if the variable costs of Red Parcel Post
are higher than the variable costs of GLS. In this case, we can also observe an
increase in the market shares of DHL, DPD, and UPS as well as in the number of
parcels delivered by the incumbent operators. As in the first scenario, we observe
2.00 1.60 1.50
DHL 185,791,667 176,041,667 173,604,167
29.04% 27.11% 26.63%
DPD 185,791,667 176,041,667 173,604,167
29.04% 27.11% 26.63%
UPS 146,791,667 137,041,667 134,604,167
22.95% 21.10% 20.65%
Red Parcel Post 39,541,667 88,291,667 100,479,167
6.18% 13.59% 15.41%
Market Volume
Price
640,888,213 650,736,698 653,198,819
2.27 2.20 2.19
 cred parcel
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that the absolute change in the number of parcels delivered by DHL, DPD, and
UPS is the same for each operator. However, the percentage change is slightly
larger for UPS. For example, the increase in parcels delivered by UPS is about
7.54% in the first case ( ), whereas the increase for DHL and
DPD is 5.86 %. Note that the number of parcels delivered by the incumbent
operators will increase even if total market volume decreases. The explanation for
this remarkable result is quiet simple. The reason is the competitive position of
the incumbent operators. As long as variable costs of Red Parcel Post are higher
than the variable costs of the former competitor GLS, each of the incumbent
operators has larger competitive advantages compared to Red Parcel Post than
compared to GLS. The better competitive position allows DHL, DPD, and UPS
to increase the number of parcels even if total market volume decreases.
Table 5: Total Contribution Margin and percentage changes (Comparing pre-entry to Scenario 2
equilibrium outcomes)
The second important result in this scenario is the development of TCM. As
we can see in Table 5, the TCM of UPS is more sensitive to the variable costs of
Red Parcel Post than the TCM of DHL and DPD. If Red Parcel Post enters the
market with high variable costs, we will observe that the percentage increase in
the TCM of UPS is higher than the increase of DHL and DPD. Nevertheless, if
the variable costs of Red Parcel Post are low, we will observe a higher percentage
decrease in the TCM of UPS compared to DHL and DPD. The reason for the
higher percentage volatility of UPS's TCM is that the percentage change in the
number of parcels of UPS is larger than the percentage change of DHL and DPD.
This result highlights the importance of realized economies of scale for the
prospects of the incumbent operators. The larger the realized economies of scale
the lower will be the effects on the TCM. This means that the large operators will
have better chances to stay in the market after the market entry of Red Parcel Post.
2.00 1.60 1.50
DHL 236,024,228 211,902,006 206,074,575
12.07% 0.62% -2.15%
DPD 236,024,228 211,902,006 206,074,575
12.07% 0.62% -2.15%
UPS 147,335,339 128,413,117 123,885,686
15.65% 0.80% -2.76%
Red Parcel Post 22,114,043 43,491,820 47,820,640
- - -
€.c parcelred 002 =
 cred parcel
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6.4.  Sensitivity Analysis
Unfortunately, we do not have any insights regarding the demand structure in the
German B2B parcel market. Therefore, we did our analysis with judgmental
estimates of the price elasticity of demand. It is clear that the values of price
elasticity directly affect the cost structure and thus TCM. However, as we can
show in this section, our estimates for the market shares and the ratios of
percentage changes in TCM are not sensitive to this assumption.
We did the simulation of our model for another four values of price elasticity
(0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8). The corresponding values of DHL's variable costs are
given by , , , and . To compare the
different cases we assume, that in each case the variable costs of Red Parcel Post
are 10% above the variable costs of GLS. The assumption on the magnitude of
the cost disadvantage is again arbitrary. However, the results presented in this
section do not change as long as we assume the same cost disadvantage for each
case.
Table 6: Market shares for different values of cDHL
Table 6 summarizes the market shares for different values of . The
market shares of the incumbent operators are robust to the assumed cost structure.
The maximum difference is observable for DHL and DPD with .
This indicates that the market shares of the incumbent operators are a good
approximation on the effect of Red Parcel Post's market entry. However, the
market shares of Red Parcel Post are more sensitive to the assumed cost structure.
The reason for this sensitivity is the following. For large values of  the
variable costs of Red Parcel Post are closer to the market price which forces Red
Parcel Post to offer just a small number of services. 
Table 7: Change in TCM for different values of cDHL (Comparing post-entry to pre-entry
equilibrium outcomes)
DHL DPD UPS GLS Red Parcel Post
0.50 24.88% 24.88% 18.98% 12.09% 10.03%
0.75 24.98% 24.98% 19.08% 12.19% 9.53%
1.00 25.13% 25.13% 19.22% 12.32% 8.83%
1.25 25.36% 25.36% 19.44% 12.53% 7.74%
1.50 25.76% 25.76% 19.82% 12.88% 5.87%
DHL DPD UPS GLS
0.50 -12.20% -12.20% -15.54% -22.82%
0.75 -11.60% -11.60% -14.79% -21.74%
1.00 -10.75% -10.75% -13.71% -20.19%
1.25 -9.45% -9.45% -12.06% -17.80%
1.50 -7.18% -7.18% -9.19% -13.61%
50.cDHL = 750.cDHL = 251.cDHL = 51.cDHL =
DHLc
DHLc
%.ms 880=∆
DHLc
DHLc
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To assess the prospect of the incumbent operators we calculated the
percentage change of the TCM between the post-entry and the pre-entry outcome.
At first glance Table 7 this seems not a good idea. The percentage decrease in the
total contribution margin is quiet sensitive to the assumed cost structure.
However, there is a constant that allows us to use the percentage change in total
contribution margin as an indicator for the prospects of the incumbent service
operators. It is the ratio of the decrease in TCM of UPS and GLS to the decrease
in TCM of DHL. This ratio lies for UPS between 1.274 and 1.279 and for GLS
between 1.870 and 1.879. Roughly speaking, the percentage decrease in TCM of
UPS is about one third larger than the percentage decrease of DHL whereas the
percentage decrease of GLS is twice as large as the decrease of DHL. This result
shows that our conclusion on the relative weakness of GLS at the end of Section
5.2 is independent of the assumed cost structure.
7.   Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the market entry of Red Parcel Post, a new player in the
German Business-to-Business (B2B) parcel market. We describe the German
B2B parcel market, the traditional parcel delivery system used by the incumbent
providers, and Red Parcel Post's business strategy and its new parcel delivery
system. Subsequently, we develop a game-theoretic model to analyze the effect
of Red Parcel Post's market entry on competition, market shares, prices, costs and
profits. The model is a Cournot model with economies of scale and different cost
functions.
We show that entry with a new delivery system that leads to lower fixed costs,
but possibly higher variable cost is highly attractive for Red Parcel Post. As long
all incumbent operators are still active in the market after the entry of Red Parcel
Post, prices will decrease and the incumbent operators will lose TCM. In contrast,
if Red Parcel Post drives out one competitor, the remaining competitors will
benefit from Red Parcel Post`s entry through higher prices, larger market shares
and higher TCM.
It is not clear, however, if and when we will see these developments in the
market. The long run effects on prices and TCM depend on the evolution of the
RFID technology, in particular the development of the unit tagging costs and the
costs for RFID writing and reading devices (Kleist, Chapman, Sakai, & Jarvis,
2004; Dutta, Lee, & Whang, 2007) which determine Red Parcel Post's variable
costs. Given that costs for the application of RFID on a unit level (i.e., parcel
tagging) are expected to decrease over time (Tajima, 2007), there is a high
likelihood that market entry of Red Parcel Post becomes feasible and that the
developments outlined in this paper materialize. However, in addition to the
technical progress in the RFID technology, learning curve/experience effects will
also work in favor of Red Parcel Post. If the decrease in variable cost of Red
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Parcel Post is high enough, we will observe lower prices and a decrease in TCM
of the incumbent operators, even if Red Parcel Post drives out one competitor.
Logistics service providers have frequently been considered to be on a
comparatively low level with respect to their innovation activities compared to
firms in other industries. One broader conclusion that can be made from our paper
is that innovation can change the structure and competitive forces in markets for
logistics services. With a new market approach and a new, technology-driven
parcel delivery system, Red Parcel Post's attempt includes both, product/service
and process innovations (Sheffi, 2004; Wagner, 2008).
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